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to Statutory Protection: Allowing
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Takes the Teeth Out of the Family
and Medical Leave Act
By ABBEY M. GLENN*
Introductiont
IN 1993, CONGRESS ENACTED the Family and Medical Leave Act
("FMLA"), 1 federal legislation mandating certain employers provide
unpaid leave to employees who need time off from work to care for a
new child, a sick parent or child, or themselves. Once it became law,
litigation resulted and required courts to interpret and apply the
FMLA to a variety of situations. One of the most contested issues is
whether the FMLA permits employees to waive their right to pursue a
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thank my parents, Robert and Trudi Glenn, and my brother, Alex Glenn, for their
unwavering support and lawyer jokes. Additionally, I thank Professor Michelle Travis for
her insight and guidance, and I thank my friends who encouraged me to publish. I extend
my sincere gratitude to my editor, Jack Praetzellis, for his thorough and tireless efforts to
refine and polish this Comment.
t One week before this Comment was published, the Department of Labor issued
its final regulations interpreting the FMLA, available at 73 Fed. Reg. 68,083, 68,084 (Nov.
17, 2008) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825). These regulations clarify that while
"[e]mployees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their
prospective rights under FMLA," 29 C.F.R. § 825-220(d) (2007), section 825.220(d) "does
not prevent the settlement or release of FMLA claims by employees based on past
employer conduct without the approval of the Department of Labor or a court." 73 Fed.
Reg. at 68,084. This Comment does not address the issuance of the final regulations
because of its proximity to this issue's publication date.
1. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654
(2000)).
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claim for a violation of the FMLA in a severance agreement, dispute
release, or settlement with an employer.
Several courts have rendered conflicting decisions on this issue.2
The first federal appellate court to tackle the employee waiver issue
was the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ultimately ruled that em-
ployees can waive their right to pursue an FMLA claim.3 Several years
later, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a contrary conclu-
sion and held that the Department of Labor ("DOL") regulation in-
terpreting the FMLA prohibits employee waivers of this kind.4 A
district court in Pennsylvania arrived at a decision that falls in the mid-
dle of these two circuit court opinions and concluded that employee
waivers are permissible in limited contexts. 5 Because other courts will
certainly face this issue in the future, it requires resolution.
This Comment argues that in order to fulfill the purposes of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, courts should adopt a per se rule bar-
ring employer-employee agreements in which employees waive their
right to pursue a claim alleging an FMLA violation. Completely bar-
ring waivers of the FMLA right to pursue a claim will achieve the stat-
ute's explicit policy goals to level the workplace playing field between
men and women, ensure that workers can care for themselves and
their families, and protect workers when they are the most vulnera-
ble.6 Furthermore, a per se rule will clarify the current court confu-
sion, provide certainty, address unequal bargaining power between
employees and employers, and deter employers' bad behavior.
This Comment analyzes the existing court opinions and provides
a standard for future decisions. Part I explains the history and pur-
poses of the FMILA, the DOL regulations instituted to implement it,
2. Compare Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d 454 (Taylor HI) (4th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008) (prohibiting employee waiver of FMLA claims), and
Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 2045857 (D. Or. July 17, 2006) (holding that
employee waivers of FMLA claims are unenforceable without approval), and Dierlam v.
Wesleyjessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (prohibiting employee waiver of
FMLA rights and claims), and Bluitt v. Eval Co. of Am., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Tex.
1998) (holding that the FMLA regulation prohibits employee waivers of FMLA claims),
with Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that employee
waivers of FMLA claims are enforceable), and Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007
WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007) (permitting employee waiver of past FMLA claims as
part of a severance agreement or settlement with the employer). The Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Taylor II reinstated the court's previous decision in Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.
(Taylor 1), 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2005) holding that FMLA waivers are unenforceable.
3. See Faris, 332 F.3d 316.
4. See Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454.
5. See Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b).
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and the impact of both. Part I also scrutinizes the court opinions that
interpret the FMLA and DOL regulations. Part II outlines two pro-
posed solutions for the issue: allow all employee FMLA waivers and
agreements that contain FMLA waivers, or use a balancing test to de-
termine whether the employee's waiver was voluntary or coerced. This
Comment analyzes the feasibility of the current proposals and possible
outcomes and suggests a bright-line rule barring employee waivers
under the FMLA as an alternate solution.
I. Background
A. Overview of the FMLA and Its Regulations
The FMLA requires employers with fifty or more employees 7 to
provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave each year to eligible work-
ers who have serious health conditions or need to take time off work
to care for a newborn or adopted child, or a spouse, child, or parent
with a serious health condition.8 Congress promulgated this legisla-
tion in response to changing social conditions, including a sharp in-
crease in the number of dual-income households and working
parents. 9 The FMLA ensures that working parents can take time off
from work to care for their families and not lose their jobs for doing
so. The FMLA's delineated purposes are to aid work-life balance,
strengthen families, provide job security for workers when they or
their family members experience serious health conditions, and pre-
vent gender discrimination in the workplace.' 0
Legislators worked for years to create the FMLA, and the statute
is the product of compromise."1 The final legislation is less generous
than the original concept 12 because it provides only unpaid leave1"
and covers a limited class of workers. 1 4 Although not all encompass-
7. Id. § 2611(4) (A) (i).
8. Id. § 2612.
9. Id. § 2601(a).
10. Id.
11. The first version of the bill was introduced in 1985, but the final version did not
pass until 1993. During this time, many changes were made to the proposed law due to
political wrangling and compromise. See WILL AITCHISON, THE FMLA 10 (2003). President
George H. W. Bush even vetoed the bill two times. Charles L. Baum, Has Family Leave
Legislation Increased Leave-Taking?, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL' 93, 94 (2004).
12. See Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. § 102 (1989).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c).
14. Id. § 2611(4) (A) (i). The current FMLA is more limited than prior drafts because
it covers only employees who work for businesses employing fifty or more employees. Ear-
lier versions applied to businesses with only thirty-five or more employees. See Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770.
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ing, the FMLA remains a meaningful statute because it enables work-
ers to preserve their jobs while dealing with a drastic family change or
health crisis. Moreover, the FMLA recognizes employees' dual na-
tures-not only are employees workers, but they have family responsi-
bilities outside of work that impact their work lives. For example, the
FMLA allows covered employees to take up to four months leave from
work to stay home and bond with a new baby or provide round-the-
clock care for an ailing parent.
The FMLA provides employees both substantive and proscriptive
rights. Its substantive rights include the right to take FMLA leave from
work under certain circumstances 15 and the right to reinstatement
when returning from this leave. 1 6 Its proscriptive rights protect em-
ployees from employer discrimination or retaliation for exercising
their substantive FMLA rights.17
The FMLA states, "It shall be unlawful for any employer to inter-
fere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise,
any right provided under this subchapter."1 8 In addition, the statute
provides a self-described "[r] ight of action" and guarantees that "[a] n
action... may be maintained against any employer (including a pub-
lic agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by
any one or more employees."'19 As evidenced by its headings and lan-
guage, the FMLA explicitly grants employees the right to sue their
employers. 20
The statute itself does not distinguish a "right" from a "claim" or
"cause of action," yet some courts have created this false dichotomy.21
These courts fabricate a distinction that does not exist in the statute's
text2 2 and use this distinction to justify allowing employees to waive
their right to pursue an FMIA claim. Court-sanctioned employee
waiver of the right to sue is inconsistent with the plain language of the
statute.
Congress charged the DOL with creating regulations to imple-
ment the FMLA, which the DOL issued in 1995.23 One regulation in
15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612.
16. Id. § 2614(a).
17. Id. § 2615.
18. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
19. Id. § 2617(a) (2).
20. Id.
21. See Faris v. Williams WTC-l, Inc., 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cin. 2003); Dougherty v. Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a) (2).
23. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220 (2007).
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particular, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220, is crucial to the issue of whether em-
ployees may waive their right to pursue an FMLA claim against an
employer because the FMLA itself does not directly address this issue.
The regulation states:
The FMLA prohibits interference with an employee's rights under
the law, and with legal proceedings or inquiries relating to an em-
ployee's rights. More specifically, the law contains the following
employee protections: (1) An employer is prohibited from interfer-
ing with, restraining, or denying the exercise of (or attempts to
exercise) any rights provided by the Act.2 4
Within the same section, the regulation further states, "Employ-
ees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their
rights under FMLA. '' 25 Yet courts inconsistently interpret this regula-
tion. "[C]ourts have spent thousands in trying to settle on its mean-
ing. And the result has been a lack of consensus among the federal
courts as to the correct interpretation of Section 825.220(d)." 26 As a
result, courts have used a variety of approaches to address this issue
and reached different conclusions. 27
B. The Current Jurisdictional Split
1. Contradicting Interpretations of the Regulation
The language of the FMLA is silent on whether employees can
waive the right to pursue a cause of action against an employer. The
relevant question, then, is whether the DOL's regulation permits or
prohibits employees to waive their FM[A right to pursue a claim
against an employer. Today a jurisdictional split exists between the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which rendered a decision that bans
employee waivers of FMLA claims,28 and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which held that employees can waive their right to sue in
post-dispute settlements. 29 In addition, several district courts arrived
at decisions similar to the Fourth Circuit by prohibiting employee
waivers of FMLA claims.30 One district court reached a conclusion
comparable to the Fifth Circuit and held that employees can waive
24. Id. § 825.220(a)(1).
25. Id. § 825.220(d).
26. Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *1.
27. See cases cited supra note 2.
28. Taylor II, 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008).
29. Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2003).
30. See, e.g., Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July
17, 2006); Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2002);
Bluitt v. Eval Co. of Am., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 761, 764 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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and settle claims for past violations of the FMIA,3' 1 which further per-
petuated the confusion. Courts, employers, and employees need a
clear rule to follow.
This unsettled area of law has far-reaching implications, and a
clear standard would allay many concerns. First, employers are anx-
ious about the existing circuit split and uncertainty in jurisdictions
where courts have not yet ruled on this issue. 32 Employers are unsure
whether to offer severance agreements to employees in return for a
waiver of FMLA claims, concerned that these employees may accept
the severance money but later sue the employer for FMLA violations
anyway.313 If such agreements are legal in the employer's jurisdiction,
the employer should know what procedural rules apply when seeking
these agreements, whether they are severance agreements with re-
leases or settlements. 34
Second, in light of the current split, it is unresolved how far the
FMLA's protection actually extends and what employees' rights are
under the statute. It is unclear what is in an employee's best interest
when an employer offers her a severance agreement that includes a
release from all future claims, including FMLA claims. Should an em-
ployee who has taken FMLA leave retain an attorney immediately
when offered such an agreement to determine whether to sign or re-
tain the right to sue by not signing? This unresolved issue also affects
employers' interests. For example, in the event that an employee signs
an agreement releasing the employer from all claims, does this agree-
ment conflict with the FMLA and can courts find it unenforceable? If
so, the employee could pursue an FMLA claim, even though the em-
ployer believed that the matter was settled because the employer paid
a lump sum for the signed release.
Third, court interpretations of the regulation directly affect em-
ployees and their families, and the statute requires a consistent inter-
pretation that furthers rather than conflicts with the FMLA's goals.
These goals are work-life balance, stronger families, employee job se-
curity, and eradication of gender discrimination in the workplace. 35
31. See Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *7.
32. See David K Haase & John W. Drury, Court Finds a Trap Hidden in Separation Agree-
ments: The Fourth Circuit Says Employees Cannot Waive FMLA Claims, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 9, 2006, at
S2 (2006).
33. Id. at S4.
34. Id. (noting that the Fourth Circuit currently permits only court or DOL-approved
waivers of employee FMLA claims).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000).
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Courts' interpretations determine whether the FMLA's express pur-
poses and goals are implemented.
36
2. Courts That Limit Employees' FMLA Rights
i. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Limits Employees' FMLA
Rights by Permitting Waiver of Claims
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first decision on this
issue. In Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc.,37 the Fifth Circuit heard an inter-
locutory appeal on behalf of an employer defendant against a suit
brought by an employee alleging that the employer fired her in retali-
ation for asserting her FMLA rights. 38 The district court ruled against
the employer and issued summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff
employee. 39 The plaintiff employee argued that her employer's termi-
nation release, which waived her right to pursue any and all claims
(although the release did not specifically mention the FMLA), was un-
enforceable under 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d). 40
In its de novo review of the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment, the Fifth Circuit first analyzed the plain language of the regula-
tion that states, "Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce
employees to waive, their rights under FMLA. ''41 The court focused on
the definition of the word "employee" and found it ambiguous in the
FMLA. 42 The court then examined the entire section of the regula-
tion and found that the term "employee" in this context refers only to
current employees and not terminated employees. 43 Without affirma-
tively resolving the issue, the court implied that, because the defen-
dant had already decided to fire the plaintiff, she was a terminated
employee. Therefore, the regulation did not apply to the plaintiff or
any other employee who signed a termination release.
44
The court then addressed the employer's argument that the regu-
lation applied only to substantive FMLA rights, including the rights to
leave and reinstatement, but did not apply to an employee's cause of
36. Id.
37. 332 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2003).
38. Id. at 318.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007).
42. Far/s, 332 F.3d at 319-20 ("Once it is established that the term 'employees' in-
cludes former employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is
necessarily ambiguous." (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 377, 343-44 (1997))).
43. Id. at 320.
44. Id. at 322.
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action. 45 The court concluded that "the regulation never refers to the
cause of action for damages as a right under FMLA. ''46 By examining
the word "right" in context of the FMLA, the court drew a bright line
between "right" and "claim" and concluded that a claim is not a sub-
stantive right in and of itself.47 "The cause of action for retaliation...
is a protection for FMLA rights, the waiver of which is not prohibited by
the regulation. '48 The court further divided substantive FMLA rights
from causes of action by stating, "A plain reading of the regulation is
that it prohibits prospective waiver of rights, not the post-dispute set-
tlement of claims. '49 According to the court's reasoning, employees
are free to sign releases preventing them from pursuing FMLA claims
because a cause of action for an FMLA violation is not a substantive
right guaranteed by the statute.50
However, this is a false dichotomy. Rights and claims are interde-
pendent and cannot operate without the other. The Faris court's hold-
ing dismisses the grave importance of causes of action, which are the
enforcement mechanism of substantive rights. The court ignored the
clear implication of its holding-substantive rights are worthless if in-
dividuals cannot enforce them. Without a mechanism to enforce a
right (the claim or cause of action), in effect there is no right-it re-
mains purely theoretical. The court's conclusion misinterpreted the
regulation and reduced the inherent protection of substantive FMLA
rights and the statute as a whole. Permitting employees to waive their
FMLA claims ultimately erodes the FMLA's substantive rights.
The court's final analysis considered public policy. The Fifth Cir-
cuit has allowed waivers of the right to sue under the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA") 5 1 and Title VII, 52 two anti-
discrimination statutes. 53 It found that these waivers do not violate
public policy because public policy favors voluntary settlement of em-
ployment discrimination claims.5 4 The court stated, "We know, how-
45. Id. at 320.
46. Id. at 320-21.
47. Id. at 321 n.5 (citing Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., 179 F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir.
1999)).
48. Id. at 321.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
53. Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2003); see also EEOC v.
Cosmair, Inc., L'Oreal Hair Care Div., 821 F.2d 1085, 1091 (5th Cir. 1987); Rogers v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir. 1986).
54. Faris, 332 F.3d at 321.
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ever, of no good reason . . .why the government would proscribe
waiver for FMLA retaliation claims and yet favor waiver of claims for
age discrimination under ADEA and for civil rights violations under
title VII.'55 Here, the court incorrectly analogized the FMLA only to
anti-discrimination statutes. 56
ii. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania Also Limits Employees'
FMLA Rights
A Pennsylvania district court issued a decision that also limits em-
ployees' rights under the FMLA. In Dougherty v. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc.,5 7 the court came to the same conclusion as the Faris court
when it held that the regulation permits employees to waive and settle
their claims for past FMLA violations.58 However, the Dougherty court's
reasoning differed from the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Faris.
In Dougherty, the employee plaintiff filed suit against the defen-
dant employer for FMLA violations.5 9 The plaintiff signed a severance
agreement that included a general release requiring the plaintiff to
waive her right to pursue any claims against her employer. However,
the release did not specifically name the FMLA.60 The defendant ar-
gued the regulation barred only the prospective waiver of rights and
not the retrospective waiver of claims. 61 The defendant also argued
that the DOL's own interpretation of the regulation did not bar the
settlement of claims, and that this interpretation deserved deference
because it emanated from the very agency promulgating the
regulation.62
To analyze the DOL's interpretation, the court employed a tradi-
tional standard of review set forth in the iconic case Chevron, USA, inc.,
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.63 The court stated, "The initial
inquiry under Chevron, therefore, is whether Congress, in enacting the
FMLA, explicitly provided for or precluded the waiver of claims. '64
55. Id. at 322.
56. See discussion infra Part II.C.
57. 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
58. Id. at *7.
59. Id. at *1.
60. Id. at *1 n.3. The release stated: "'DOUGHERTY does hereby REMISE, RELEASE
AND FOREVER DISCHARGE TEVA... of and from any and in all manner of actions,
causes of action, suits, debts, claims and demands arising from or relating in any way to her
employment with TEVA."' Id. (alternation in original) (citation omitted).
61. Id. at *3.
62. Id.
63. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
64. Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *4.
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The court concluded Congress did not expressly address the issue.65
The following step in the Chevron analysis was to determine if the
DOL's interpretation of the regulation was reasonable. If so, it would
be entitled to the court's deference. 66 The court examined the argu-
ment that persuaded the Fifth Circuit-that a meaningful distinction
exists between a "claim" and a substantive "right,"67 and rejected it,
stating:
The net effect being that the employee would still have substantive
rights under the FMLA but no way to enforce them. Section
825.220(d) does not permit this type of agreement, however. The
regulation prohibits the waiver of any right under the FMLA ....
To read the regulation in that manner would be introducing a dis-
tinction that the text does not support.68
In a footnote, the court rejected the maxim "where there is a
right, there is remedy."69 It cited a United States Supreme Court case
that held state employees do not have a private remedy against state
employers for Fair Labor Standards Act violations, and the basis for
this decision was a separation of powers argument.70 Although the
Dougherty decision does not rest on this footnote, this Comment ex-
plicitly challenges the extension of this analysis to the FMLA context.
Courts should not apply this idea to FMILA litigation against private
employers because this case was limited to state employers. Addition-
ally, the FMLA is different because it specifically provides employees a
cause of action against state employers. 71
The Dougherty court recognized that an employee's ability to
bring a cause of action is a right and thus rejected the Fifth Circuit's
reasoning for barring employee waivers.7 2 Nevertheless, the court as-
serted that an employee's cause of action is not a right under the
FMLA.73 The court stated that "the decision to bring a claim (i.e. exer-
cise one's proscriptive rights) is not a separate right under the
[FMLA] .,,y4 The FMLA provides both substantive rights, including the
right to FMLA leave, and proscriptive rights, like an employee's right
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *5 ("[P]roperly understood, these are distinct concepts.").
68. Id.
69. Id. at *5 n.16.
70. Id. ("It is not always the case that there exists a private remedy (i.e. an individual
cause of action) for the violation of one's fights.").
71. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (B) (2000).
72. Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *5-6.
73. Id. at *6.
74. Id.
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to sue for a violation. 75 The court introduced a third category, the
employee's decision to sue, and stated that the FMILA does not provide
the right to sue because the FMLA does not mandate employees bring
causes of action. 76 The court reasoned that only when an employer
violates the FMLA does an employee decide whether to pursue a
claim, and therefore the FMLA does not guarantee the right to sue.
77
The court created a distinction between the right to sue and an
individual's decision to exercise that right. Ultimately, the court
found that even if an employee settles a past FMLA claim, thus giving
up her decision to exercise the right to sue, the employee retains all of
her FMLA rights because she is still entitled to take FMLA leave and
has all FMLA remedies available to her.78 In other words, the court
divorces the right to sue from an individual's decision to exercise the
right to sue. This reasoning is unpersuasive. Practically speaking,
there is no difference between having the right to bring a cause of
action and making the decision to do so. Further, the court's reason-
ing renders the ability to pursue a cause of action meaningless. If the
FMLA does not guarantee employees the decision to sue, then why
does the FMLA provide the remedy at all?79
The Dougherty court concluded its Chevron analysis by finding the
DOL's interpretation of the regulation reasonable. s0 Therefore, the
court decided employees may waive FMIA claims as part of a settle-
ment or severance agreement with an employer.8 To support its deci-
sion, the court cited other cases in which employees were permitted to
waive past claims for violations of anti-discrimination statutes. The
court stated that it knew of "no good reason" why the FMLA should be
different. 82 As discussed i'nfira, this Comment argues that there is a
significant difference between the FMLA and federal anti-discrimina-
tion statutes like Title VII and the ADEA.
Recently, the court issued a subsequent decision in the same
case,8 3 in which the court reaffirmed its prior holding based on the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See Taylor I, 493 F.3d 454, 459 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008)
(discussing the Dougherty court's confusion of an employee's decision to exercise the right
to sue with a waiver of this right).
80. Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *6.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *5.
83. Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2008 WIL 508011 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008).
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distinction between a current and former employee.8 4 The court
stated:
An employee who remains employed with the same employer after
entering into a settlement agreement continues to enjoy the protec-
tions of the FMLA vis-a-vis that employer. And thus the employee
can bring suit in the future for any later violations of the FMLA on
the part of that employer. But one who enters into a severance
agreement (which includes a waiver of past FMLA claims) is no
longer an employee and enjoys no FMLA protections against a for-
mer employer.8 5
The court found that the plaintiffs FMLA claim had accrued and
the release within the severance agreement waived that claim.8 6 Con-
sequently, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the plaintiffs claim. 87
3. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Protects Employees' FMLA
Rights
The leading case prohibiting employee waiver of FMLA claims is
Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc.8 8 Issued by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the Taylor opinion is one of four decisions protecting em-
ployees' rights to bring a claim under the FMLA.89 Upon hearing this
case for the first time, 90 the Fourth Circuit concluded that 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.220(d) "prohibits both the prospective and retrospective waiver
of any FMLA right unless the waiver has the prior approval of the
Department of Labor or a court."9 1 The defendant requested a re-
hearing en banc, and subsequently, the Fourth Circuit vacated its first
decision while it heard arguments against the Taylor I decision. 92 Ulti-
84. Id. at *4.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *9. An interesting issue, which exceeds the analysis of this Comment, is that
the court's decision was also partly based on a finding that the release itself was enforcea-
ble. Id. The court employed a multi-factor test to determine whether the plaintiff signed
the release knowingly and voluntarily, although this test was based on analogizing the
FMLA to anti-discrimination statutes. Id. at *4-9. This analysis applied some of the same
factors that Carol Wong suggests courts use to determine whether a release is knowing and
voluntary. See Carol Wong, Note, The Family and Medical Leave Act: To Waive, Or Not To
Waive, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 1567, 1595 (2007); see also discussion infta Part II.B.
88. 493 F.3d 454 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008).
89. See generally Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 2045857 (D. Or. July 17,
2006); Dierlam v. WesleyJessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Bluitt v. Eval
Co. of Am., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
90. Taylor L 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2005).
91. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 456.
92. Id.
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mately, however, the Fourth Circuit was not persuaded and reinstated
its original decision in Taylor II.9 Through this procedural posture,
the Taylor case provides a useful guide in analyzing the arguments
against allowing a waiver of employee rights under the FMLA.
First, the court analyzed the regulation itself. The court reasoned
that the FMLA provides three types of rights: substantive (the right to
take FMLA leave), proscriptive (the right not to be retaliated or dis-
criminated against), and remedial (the right to bring a claim and re-
cover damages) . 9 4 The court stated, "The regulation, by specifying
'rights under FMLA,' therefore refers to all rights under FMLA, includ-
ing the right to bring an action or claim for a violation of the Act."
95
The court looked to the enforcement section of the FMLA, which
makes it "unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or
deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided
under [the FMLA]." 9 6 The court concluded the right to bring a claim
is a right provided under the FMLA, and therefore an employee can-
not waive the right to sue.9 7 The court did not find a distinction be-
tween right and claim, and instead stated that the relevant regulation
language is the word "waive." 98 Because many courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, repeatedly use the word "waive" to in-
clude both past and future claims, the court concluded the regulation
prohibiting waiver applies to settlements of past claims.9 9
Next, the court focused on the DOL's argument in support of its
interpretation of the regulation. The DOL asserted the regulation
only applies to proscriptive FMLA rights (the right not to be retaliated
or discriminated against) and not to settlement of FMLA claims. 0 0
The court expressly rejected this argument and highlighted the
DOL's shifting arguments to the Fourth Circuit and to the Dougherty
court.10 1 In its brief to the Dougherty court, the DOL conceded that the
right to assert a claim is a right under the FMLA. 10 2 In its amicus brief
to the Fourth Circuit, however, the DOL argued that a claim is distinct
93. Id. at 463.
94. Id. at 457.
95. Id.
96. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
97. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 458.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 459.
100. Id. at 458.
101. Id. at 458-59.
102. Id. at 458.
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from a right and therefore not protected from waiver by the
regulation. 0 3
The court also analyzed the DOL's intent when drafting the regu-
lation and found the DOL specifically rejected a proposal to expressly
allow waivers of FMLA claims in settlements and severance agree-
ments.10 4 The DOL rejected the proposal at that time, stating, "The
Department has given careful consideration . . .and has concluded
that prohibitions against employees waiving their rights and employ-
ers inducing employees to waive their rights constitute sound public
policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards
statutes such as the [Fair Labor Standards Act]."105 Therefore, the
Taylor court concluded, the DOL intended to prohibit waivers of all
FMLA rights when it originally created the regulation, and thus the
court did not adopt the current DOL's interpretation of the regula-
tion. 10 6 This analysis was correct because the DOL's recent arguments
are inconsistent with each other and conflict with the expressly stated
intent of the regulation when it was adopted. 10 7 The DOL's position is
a poor tool for interpreting the regulation or the FMLA because it is
subject to change and political whim. Therefore, courts should reject
it when addressing this issue.
The Taylor court next examined the policy implications of al-
lowing employees to waive FMLA claims. The court stated:
[P]rivate settlements of FMLA claims undermine Congress's objec-
tive of imposing uniform minimum standards. Because the FMLA
requirements increase the cost of labor, employers would have an
incentive to deny FMLA benefits if they could settle violation
claims for less than the cost of complying with the statute. Further,
employers settling claims at a discount would gain a competitive
advantage over employers complying with the FMLA's minimum
standards. To avoid these problems, [the regulation] ... prohibits
the waiver of all FMLA rights. 0 8
103. See Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 4-7, Taylor v. Progress Energy, Inc., 493 F.3d
454 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 04-1525), available at https://www.dol.gov/sol/media/briefs/Tay-
lor(A)-07-16-2007.pdf; Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendant-Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3-6, Taylor v. Progress Energy,
Inc., 415 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-1525), available at https://www.dol.gov/sol/
media/briefs/taylor-08-16-2005.pdf.
104. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 461.
105. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995).
106. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 461-62.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
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The court further supported its conclusion by citing a United
States Supreme Court opinion holding "settlement or waiver of claims
is not permitted when 'it would thwart the legislative policy which [the
employment law] was designed to effectuate.' "1
09
The court rejected comparing the FMLA to anti-discrimination
statutes, reasoning the FMLA is more like the Fair Labor Standards
Act ("FLSA"), which is a wage and hour statute. 110 Ultimately, the
court held that "29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) bars the prospective and retro-
spective waiver or release of rights under the FMLA, including the
right to bring an action or claim for a violation of the Act."'11 Interest-
ingly, the court provided one caveat to this rule at the end of its opin-
ion. Because the court found that Congress modeled the FMLA after
the FLSA, which permits the waiver or release of claims with prior
DOL or court approval,11 2 the court held that the FMLA also allows
these supervised settlements. 1
3
C. The FMLA is Both an Anti-Discrimination Statute and a Wage
and Hour Statute
Courts diverge on the issue of upholding employee waivers of
FMLA claims and on another fundamental fault line: how to charac-
terize the FMLA and use such characterization as a basis for determin-
ing whether to permit waivers of the right to pursue an FMLA
claim.'1 4 As outlined above, some courts have analogized the FMLA to
anti-discrimination statutes and found that, because anti-discrimina-
tion statutes generally allow waivers, so too should the FMLA. 15 Other
courts and the DOL have analogized the FMLA to the FLSA, a wage
and hour statute."16 Because the FLSA does not permit waivers, those
courts reason that the FMLA should also prohibit waivers."
7
109. Id. (citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 704 (1945)). The FMLA's
policies are to aid work-life balance, strengthen families, provide job security for workers
when they or their family members experience serious health conditions, and prevent gen-
der discrimination in the workplace. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a) (2000).
110. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 461.
111. Id. at 463.
112. Id. at 462.
113. Id. at 462-63.
114. See id. at 462; Taylor 1, 415 F.3d 364, 371 (4th Cir. 2005); Faris v. Williams WPC-I,
Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2003).
115. See Faris, 332 F.3d at 321-22; Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007 WL
1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
116. Taylor I, 493 F.3d at 462; Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 371.
117. Taylor II, 493 F.3d at 459-60.
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Both of these analogies, however, are inherently flawed because
the FMLA cannot be properly analogized to either anti-discrimination
statutes or the FSLA. In fact, the FMLA is a hybrid statute that is partly
like an anti-discrimination statute and partly like a wage and hour stat-
ute. The FMLA's remedies section mirrors that of the FLSA, a wage
and hour statute. 118 The FLSA and the FMLA both provide similar
employee protections and share a similar enforcement scheme.' 19 Yet
the FMLA also contains an anti-discrimination provision, 120 which the
FLSA does not.
It is an unnecessary distraction to determine whether the FMLA is
more like an anti-discrimination statute or more similar to a wage and
hour statute, however, because it contains elements of both. 12' To
analogize the FMLA in this manner improperly places the focus on
other statutes rather than on the FMLA itself. Courts should instead
focus on the consequences of a particular interpretation of the FMLA
and determine whether that interpretation furthers the FMLA's ex-
plicit policy goals.
II. Suggested Rules and Approaches to Employee Waiver of
FMLA Claims
The circuit split established two different rules: the Fifth Circuit
and its ilk allow employees to waive post-dispute FMLA claims in settle-
ments and severance agreements,122 while the Fourth Circuit and dis-
trict courts following its approach ban these waivers absent explicit
court or agency approval.' 23 The following section will analyze these
varying approaches along with a middle ground approach suggested
in a critique of these court decisions. Finally, this section will propose
118. TaylorI, 415 F.3d at 371; see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)-(c) (2000) (listing FLSA pen-
alties, including an employee's right to bring an action for unpaid wages and liquidated
damages); id. § 2617 (listing the FMLA enforcement provisions, including an employee's
right to bring an action against an employer and an employer's liability for lost wages and
liquidated damages).
119. Taylorl, 415 F.3d at 371.
120. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (2).
121. SeeJoNATHAN C. WILSON & HELEN THIGPEN, HAYNES & BOONE, LLP, RECENT DEVEL-
OPMENTS IN THE FMLA (2000), available at http://www.haynesboone.com/FILES/tbl_sl2
PublicationsHotTopics/PublicationPDF60/228/051 1_2000_Wilson-Thigpen.pdf.
122. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2003); Dougherty v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1165068, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
123. See TaylorlI, 493 F.3d 454, 463 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008);
Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 375 (4th Cir. 2005); Brizzee v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 2006 WL
2045857, at *11 (D. Or. July 17, 2006); Dierlam v. Wesley Jessen Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d
1052, 1055-56 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Bluitt v. Eval Co. of Am., Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763-64
(S.D. Tex. 1998).
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a per se rule banning employee waivers of FMLA claims to resolve the
current uncertainty.
A. Allow Employees to Waive FMLA Claims
The notion that public policy favors settlement underpins the
Faris court's decision allowing employees to waive FMLA claims.
1 24
The Fais court expressly stated that public policy supports waivers,
releases, and voluntary settlements of employment discrimination
claims.1 25 The court's decision rested on a dubious assumption that
settlement is good not only for the particular parties in Fais but also
for employment discrimination cases in general. 126 By applying this
assumption to the FMLA context, the court extended the public pol-
icy justification that private settlement is in the public's interest to any
and every statutory employment claim.1 27 However, no legal prece-
dent exists for this extension in the employment context. Congress
has not enacted a statute or mandate that expressly espouses this pol-
icy. In fact, the Fais court cited only to prior Fifth Circuit decisions
holding that settlements and releases of employment discrimination
claims do not violate public policy. The court did not cite to any fur-
ther authority to support extending this finding to FMLA cases. 128 To
justify its conclusion, the court relied on a vague notion of public pol-
icy grounded in the general belief that settlement reduces court con-
gestion, is faster and more efficient, and therefore is in the public's
interest.129
124. Fans, 332 F.3d at 321.
125. Id.
126. Id. ("Waivers of the right to bring suit under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ... are enforced by this court and are not void as against public policy.").
127. Id. ("Our reading of the regulation is bolstered by public policy favoring the en-
forcement of waivers and our knowledge that similar waivers are allowed in other regula-
tory contexts."); see generally Taylor I, 415 F.3d at 373 ("We agree... that there is a general
public policy favoring the post-dispute settlement of claims."); Muniza Bawaney, Comment,
Signed General Releases May Be Worth Less Than Employers Expected: Circuits Split on Whether
Former Employee Can Sign Release, Reap Its Benefit, and Sue for FMLA Claim Anyway, 82 CHI.-
Ki-r L. REv. 525 (2007) (discussing the general public policy favoring post-dispute settle-
ment of claims from a purely economic perspective, positing that litigation is socially waste-
ful and waiver is a net gain.).
128. See Faris, 332 F.3d at 321-22. Although the court concedes that the analogy be-
tween anti-discrimination statutes and the FMLA is not automatic, it ultimately rejected any
differentiation, stating: "We know, however, of no good reason-nor has [plaintiff] Faris
suggested one-why the government would proscribe waiver for FMIA retaliation claims
and yet favor waiver of claims for age discrimination under ADEA and for civil rights viola-
tions under [T]itle VII." Id. at 322.
129. Id. at 321-22.
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Strangely, the Dougherty court mentioned but did not challenge
the DOL's assertion that "prohibitions against employees waiving their
rights and employers inducing employees to waive their rights consti-
tute sound public policy,"' 3 issued when the DOL originally promul-
gated the regulation. Yet the Dougherty court's holding allows
employees to waive FMLA claims. 131 A primary reason for this decision
was the DOL's position articulated in its amicus brief.1- 2 The court
stated, "the DOL has elected to treat the settlement of FMLA claims as
being no different from the settlement of other federal employment
claims,"133 and suggested that the regulation actually encourages pri-
vate settlement of FMLA claims.134 Even in the face of the DOL's orig-
inal unequivocal statement that prohibiting employee waivers is good
public policy, the court was persuaded by the Department's surprise
change in position.' 3 5 The court's unquestioned acceptance of the
generalized notion that public policy favors private settlements in em-
ployment law underlies its reasoning.
Unfortunately, when courts permit employees to waive their right
to FMLA claims, they strip employees of the ability to use the mecha-
nism to enforce their substantive statutory rights. As a result, courts
render the FMLA toothless. Congress created the FMLA not only to
outline employer responsibilities and employee rights, but also to de-
ter employers from engaging in bad behavior and illegal conduct. 136
If courts allow employees to waive post-dispute FMLA claims through
private settlements with employers, the deterrent to wrongful em-
ployer behavior no longer exists. Settlement does not address wrong-
ful or illegal employer actions, nor does it impose penalties on
employers for not complying with the FMLA. The rule allowing em-
ployees to waive FMLA claims gives employers the power to terminate
employees for exercising their FMLA rights.
Under this rule, employers simply offer an employee who believes
her FMLA rights were violated a severance package with a general
claims release and a one-time payment in order to resolve the dispute
130. Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1165068, at *2 n.10 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
9, 2007) (emphasis removed).
131. Id. at *7.
132. The Department of Labor issued its Dougherty viewpoint fourteen years after the
regulation's original promulgation. Its dramatically different position could be the result
of the change from a Democratic administration to a Republican administration.
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id.
135. Id. at *4-6.
136. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (a) (6)-(b) (5), 2615, 2617 (2000).
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and terminate the problem employee. Consequently, it is cheaper for
employers to terminate employees than comply with the FMLA. The
employer can easily and inexpensively fire an employee for taking
FMILA leave and hire a new employee who does not have a health
condition or family situation that warrants FMLA leave at the same
wage. It is less expensive for employers to pay lump sum severance
package compensation than allow employees to take the FMILA leave
to which they are entitled. Thus, the rule encouraging private settle-
ment of FMILA disputes defeats the purpose of the statute, which sets a
job protection floor. 137
Proponents of this approach argue that settlements provide final-
ity and certainty. 138 As seen from the cases discussed above, however,
settlements are neither automatically final nor certain. A court may
find the settlements unenforceable for a variety of reasons under con-
tract law or statutory employment law. In addition, employees may
sign these waiver agreements without being aware that they have
claims against their employers. After consulting with counsel, they
may pursue litigation even though they signed releases.
Additionally, proponents argue that settlements benefit employ-
ees because they receive compensation quickly as opposed to endur-
ing a long process of court approval or litigation. 139 However, the
danger with private settlement is that the compensation may not be
fair to the employee. A private agreement may not provide payment
equal to the amount the employer owes the employee in back wages.
Furthermore, an employer-created severance package payment is
likely to provide much less compensation than the amount of money
the employcc would receive upon winning at trial or from litigation
settlement, even accounting for litigation risk reduction. Even more
alarming is the likelihood that employees are not aware of their rights
or violations of these rights when offered a settlement releasing an
employer from all claims. In nearly every one of the above cases, the
employer's settlement or severance package included only a general
release and did not specifically mention the FMLA.
140
A final argument supporting waivers and settlement agreements
is the contract law concept of encouraging and enforcing free con-
137. See WILsON & THIGPEN, supra note 121, at 4.
138. See Bawaney, supra note 127, at 547.
139. Id.
140. See Taylor I, 415 F.3d 364, 367 (4th Cir. 2005); Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332
F.3d 316, 318 (5th Cir. 2003); Dougherty v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2008 WL508011, at *2
n.3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 2008); Dougherty, 2007 WL 1165068, at *1 n.3.
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tracting among parties. This perspective, however, ignores the inher-
ent imbalance of power between the parties in the FMLA context.
Because employers subject to the FMLA must employ at least fifty em-
ployees, 41 they are likely to be large and powerful employers with ac-
cess to significant resources. The employees, on the other hand, are
particularly vulnerable when the FMLA is applicable. 142 It is easy to
imagine that an employee who was retaliated against because of her
FMLA leave would accept immediate payment in a severance package,
in part due to the incredible demands on her time, energy, and fi-
nances as a result of the situation that led her to take FMLA leave in
the first place. To assume that employers and employees have equal
bargaining power in the FMLA context is a mistake. For this and the
above reasons, the rule allowing waivers of FMLA claims is contrary to
the statute and to public policy. Therefore, courts should not adopt it.
B. Proposed Middle Ground Approach: A Waiver Guideline for
Courts
In light of the potential conflict between employers and employ-
ees regarding releases of FMLA claims, commentator Carol Wong pro-
poses a middle ground solution. 143 In her article, The Family and
Medical Leave Act: To Waive, Or Not To Waive,144 Wong asserts that
courts should allow parties to settle some FMLA claims.1 45 She sug-
gests amending the FMLA to provide a waiver guideline that balances
employer and employee interests.1 46 Wong suggests that the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA")1 47 serve as the model. 148
The OWBPA is a hybrid anti-discrimination and wage and hour stat-
ute that modified the ADEA.' 49 Using the OWBPA as a model is an
141. 29 U.S.C. § 2611.
142. Employees who take FMLA leave are vulnerable because they are dealing with
significant financial and emotional stress stemming from the cause of their FMLA leave
(i.e., a serious medical condition, a family member with a serious medical condition, or a
new addition to the family).
143. Wong, supra note 87, at 1595.
144. Id. at 1567.
145. Id. at 1595.
146. Id.
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621, 623, 626, 630 (2006).
148. Wong, supra note 87, at 1595 ("Congress should create a statutory solution
modeled on the OWrBPA to resolve the current state of disorder surrounding releases
under the FMLA.").
149. 29 U.S.C. § 621.
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appropriate analogy, though, considering that the FMLA contains ele-
ments of both anti-discrimination and wage and hour statutes. 150
The OWBPA requires "knowing and voluntary" releases and con-
tains an eight-factor test for waivers. 15 1 Wong states:
Under the OWBPA, courts do not uphold a waiver of rights and
claims . . . as "knowing and voluntary" unless: (1) it is written in
plain language, (2) it specifically refers to [the statute], (3) the
employee does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the
waiver is executed, (4) there is consideration in addition to any-
thing of value the individual is already entitled to, (5) the em-
ployee is advised to consult with an attorney, (6) the individual is
given a specified period of time to consider the agreement, (7)
there is a seven day revocation period, and (8) if there is a termina-
tion program or exit incentive program, it includes additional in-
formation about those eniployees affected.1 5 2
Wong's proposal aims to create a rule that is fair and balanced for
both employees and employers; however, a balancing test such as this
would create considerable uncertainty and is unlikely to reduce litiga-
tion. First, neither employer nor employee will know prior to litiga-
tion and a subsequent court ruling whether a particular agreement
constitutes a "knowing and voluntary waiver" that binds the parties.
This proposed rule is unpredictable because employees could sign an
agreement, later decide that the agreement did not fulfill all of the
"voluntary and knowing waiver" requirements, and then sue the em-
ployer for violating the FMLA in spite of the agreement. Uncertainty
and a lack of finality are primary critiques of the current jurisdictional
split,' 53 and the proposed balancing test does not allay these
problems. Instead, the balancing test would most likely generate more
litigation as courts would have to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether a particular agreement fulfilled each prong of the eight-part
test. A balancing test leaves excessive room for differing court inter-
pretations and results, and inserts more confusion and uncertainty
into an already confounding issue.
Additionally, Wong's proposed guideline adds another layer of
compromise favoring employers to a statute that is itself the result of
compromise. For example, one of the first versions of the FMLA ap-
plied to smaller employers (those employing thirty-five or more em-
150. See supra Part I.C.
151. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f).
152. Wong, supra note 87, at 1593 (citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (2005)).
153. See generally Bawaney, supra note 127, at 547.
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ployees),' 154 while the version enacted into law only applies to
employers with fifty or more employees. 155 Undoubtedly, the change
exempting smaller employers was adopted to alleviate the fear that
the FMLA would negatively impact small businesses, although that has
not proven to be true. 156
Wong's rule offers another concession to employers because it
allows employers to craft enforceable FMLA waivers but does not re-
solve the power imbalance between employers and employees. For ex-
ample, one element of the "knowing and voluntary" waiver test
requires that "the employee is advised to consult with an attorney."'157
It merely requires waivers to include language advising the employee
to consult an attorney rather than require the employee to actually
consult an attorney. The rule does not go far enough to balance the
power between employees and employers. In addition, employers can
easily bury this advisory language among other legal provisions that
the employee does not understand within the waiver. In so doing, the
advisory language is hidden and inconspicuous. As a result, the "know-
ing and voluntary" requirement's attempt to empower the employee
does not fulfill its purpose. Therefore, Wong's waiver test does not
safeguard of employee rights.
Moreover, the DOL already rejected an attempt to give employers
more power regarding FMLA waivers by modifying the regulations. 158
The DOL invited the public to comment on the proposed FMLA regu-
lations when they were initially created.' 5 A number of employers
and industry advocates suggested a modification to explicitly permit
employees to waive post-dispute claims, but the DOL refused, citing
public policy. 160 Furthermore, neither Congress nor the DOL
154. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1989, H.R. 770, 101st Cong. (1989).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (A) (i).
156. See Barbara Presley Noble, We're DoingJust Fine, Thank You, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1994, at F25 (noting that the FMLA has had "little negative impact," especially on small
businesses).
157. Wong, supra note 87, at 1593 (citing the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 626(0).
158. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2218 (Jan. 6, 1995).
159. Id.
160. Id. The DOL stated: "Nationsbank Corporation (Troutman Sanders), Southern
Electric International, Inc (Troutman Sanders), and Chamber of Commerce of the USA
expressed concerns with the 'no waiver of rights' provisions included in paragraph (d) of
this section. They recommended explicit allowance of waivers and releases in connection
with settlement of FMLA claims and as part of a severance package (as allowed under Title
VII and ADEA claims, for example) .... The Department has given careful consideration
to the comments received on this section and has concluded that prohibitions against em-
ployees waiving their rights and employers inducing employees to waive their rights consti-
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amended the FM[A or the regulations to comply with this sugges-
tion. 161 If courts were to interpret the regulation as permitting FMLA
claim waivers, courts would go beyond the statute and regulation and
give employers more force. This would directly conflict with the stat-
ute's legislative intent and its plain language that, "[e]mployees can-
not waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights
under FMLA."' 62 Thus, Wong's guideline would further erode the
statute's employee protection, and courts should reject it.
The "knowing and voluntary" requirement also fails to imple-
ment the FMLA's public policy goals of "increasing FMLA compliance
and promoting the interests of families."'163 The rule allows private
settlements that never become part of the public record. As a result,
employees working for an employer who settled an FMLA dispute with
another employee may never know about the violation or the settle-
ment.164 "This limited knowledge may dissuade remaining employees
from asserting their own [FMLA] rights"' 65 because they may remain
unaware that they have the right to FMLA leave, that their FMLA
rights were also violated, or that they have a cause of action.
C. Prohibiting Employee Waivers of FMLA Claims Best Protects
Employee Rights
This Comment proposes a new rule that aligns with the FMLA's
legislative intent, 66 plain language, 67 and spirit: courts should pro-
hibit all employee waivers of FMLA claims. This solution most closely
mirrors the Taylor decision but omits the inefficient Taylor exception
tute sound public policy under the FMLA, as is also the case under other labor standards
statutes such as the FLSA." Id.
161. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg. 69,504, 69,509-510 (Dec.
1, 2006) (seeking "input on whether a limitation should be placed on the ability of employ-
ees to settle their past FMLA claims"). The Department included notice that it "filed an
amicus brief in the Fourth Circuit on rehearing arguing that the regulation should be
interpreted solely to bar the waiver of prospective rights." Id. at 69,509 n.4. But see Family
and Medical Leave Act Regulations: A Report on the Department of Labor's Request for
Information, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,550 (June 28, 2007) (omitting any discussion of waiver and
the pertinent regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) (2007)).
162. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d).
163. Jessica Snorgrass, Comment, Waiving the Effectiveness of the FMLA: The Anti-Waiver
Approach to Enforceability of FMILA Severance Agreement Waivers, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 163, 208
(2008).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See supra Part I.A.
167. See supra Part I.A.
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permitting court or DOL-approved settlements.1 68 This rule also re-
jects the arbitrary distinction that some courts have created between
substantive FMLA rights and the right to bring a claim for a violation
of the statute. 169 This rule would provide every FMLA right, no matter
how defined, to employees.
This rule best implements the statute's public policy goals, in-
cluding: (1) leveling the playing field for women workers; (2) address-
ing work/family conflict and balance; (3) preserving family integrity
and stability; and (4) ensuring workers' jobs are protected while they
care for their families. 170 Employees are guaranteed recourse if an em-
ployer violates any of their FMLA rights. Thus, this rule protects em-
ployees' choices to care for themselves or family members when the
need arises, which ultimately provides family integrity and job security
for employees nationwide.
Noticeably absent from most court opinions about employee
waivers is an evaluation of the impact the court's decision will have on
the FMLA's overall goals. 171 Some courts have even ignored the
FMLA's express purposes altogether in favor of a generalized argu-
ment that private settlement is in the public's interest.172 However,
this freedom of contract argument has no basis in statutory authority.
A court decision solely based on legal principle and theory without
examining its practical effects on employees as a whole is limited. In-
stead, courts should issue decisions that further the FMLA's express
goals and public policy aims.
A per se rule banning employee waivers of FMLA claims is clear
and easy for courts to follow and implement. It provides certainty for
employees and employers because there is only one outcome: the
waiver is invalid. This rule ensures that employers will comply with the
FMLA, or else they will face consequences. Employers will know with
certainty that noncompliance results in statutory penalties and reme-
dies such as equitable relief and monetary damages, including back
168. See Taylor Il, 493 F.3d 454, 462 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2931 (2008);
Taylor I, 415 F.3d 364, 374 (4th Cir. 2005). Court approval of an FMLA waiver is inefficient
because it likely requires court review of the agreement. David K Haase, supra note 32, at
S4 (citing Lynn's Food Stores Inc. v. United States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982)).
169. See Faris v. Williams WPC-I, Inc., 332 F.3d 316, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2003).
170. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (2000).
171. See Taylor I, 493 F.3d 454; Taylor 1, 415 F.3d 364; Fars, 332 F.3d 316; Dougherty v.
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 2007 WL 1165068 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2007).
172. See Taylor, 415 F.3d at 373; Fars, 332 F.3d at 321; see also Bawaney, supra note 127,
at 525.
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wages, double liquidated damages, interest, and attorney's fees, which
operate as a strong deterrent to illegal employer conduct. 173
Furthermore, a rule prohibiting employee waiver of FMLA claims
ensures equal bargaining power between employees and employers
and a fair outcome. Banning waivers encourages employees to consult
attorneys, who serve as advocates and enable employees to make well-
informed choices about their legal options. Employees will also bene-
fit from court oversight during the litigation process because it
removes any element of coercion. This rule does not foreclose em-
ployers from initiating or negotiating settlements with employees, but
settlement occurs after employees exercise their right to sue and equal-
ize the bargaining power between the parties. 174 Finally, the rule in-
centivizes employers to comply with the FMLA because settlement
agreements are more likely than severance packages to require an em-
ployer to modify wrongful conduct.1 75
HI. Conclusion
The FMLA was designed to protect employees and, by extension,
their families. Congress enacted the statute so employees can take
leave from work to care for themselves and their families and retain
their jobs upon return. The FMLA exists to help employees balance
the competing demands of work and family and to aid workers when
they are financially and emotionally vulnerable.
Courts favoring private settlement and employee waivers because
of freedom of contract principles do not properly implement the
FMLA. These courts ignore the inherent power inequity between em-
ployers and employees, focusing on efficiency instead of employee
protection and security. Courts that permit employees to waive FMLA
claims ultimately strip the FMLA of its statutory protection for employ-
ees and leave employees without a mechanism to enforce their sub-
stantive FMLA rights.
To preserve the integrity of the statute, employees must be able
to exercise all of their FMLA rights, including the right to sue. There-
fore, courts should adopt a per se rule prohibiting employee waiver of
FMLA claims so that employees have a mechanism for recourse when
their FMLA rights are violated. This rule aligns with both the FMLA
173. 29 U.S.C. § 2617.
174. Snorgrass, supra note 163, at 208-09 (discussing the differences between a waiver
and a post-complaint settlement).
175. Id. at 209 (citing Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of the Employ-
ment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 486 (2001)).
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regulation's plain language, and it comports with the DOL's assertion
that employee waiver of claims is not in the public's best interest.
A bright-line rule such as this is easy for courts to apply, and it
clarifies this unresolved issue for employers and employees. Ulti-
mately, prohibiting employee waivers equalizes the power imbalance
between employees and employers. A per se rule does not entirely
preclude settlement, but rather safeguards employees by ensuring
they are fully apprised of their statutory rights before choosing to liti-
gate, settle, or forgo a claim altogether. Prohibiting employee waiver
of FMLA claims not only protects the individual employee and her
family, but it also guarantees that the FMLA fulfills its purpose by pro-
tecting employees as a class and encouraging employer compliance
nationwide.
